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Abstract
Some distinguished types of voters, as vetoes, passers or nulls, as well as some others,
play a significant role in voting systems because they are either the most powerful or the
least powerful voters in the game independently of the measure used to evaluate power.
In this paper we are concerned with the design of voting systems with at least one type
of these extreme voters and with few types of equivalent voters, with this purpose in
mind we enumerate these special classes of games and find out that its number always
follows a Fibonacci sequence with smooth polynomial variations. As a consequence we
find several families of games with the same asymptotic exponential behavior except for a
multiplicative factor which is the golden number or its square. From a more general point
of view, our studies are related with the design of voting structures with a predetermined
importance ranking.
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1. Introduction
Determining importance rankings is a significant issue in operational research. The
structures which are the target of our study completely rank the items (voters or com-
ponents, see e.g. [17]) from the most important to the least important according to a
well-known influence relation, so that we have a hierarchy for the items. This total rank-
ing for these structures implies also the same ranking for the most well-known measures
of importance [10], [12] and [28] so that it is unchallengeable.
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In order to design structures or mechanisms for a given hierarchy we need to count
all the possibilities available for it. The main purpose of this paper is enumerating
these versatile structures commonly used in Operations Research. Indeed, the study
of ordinal preferences involves a variety of fields, including tournament theory, multiple
criteria decision modeling (MCDM), and, more recently, data envelopment analysis of
qualitative data. As stated in the survey by Cook in [8], the notion of voter power
or relative importance has been largely ignored in studies on ordinal ranking problems,
although if a tangible estimate of voter importance exists, then these voters can be treated
like criteria in an MCDM problem. In fact, if a common ranking exists for the most well-
known power indices, this would definitively demonstrate a given importance ordering.
This approach is thus useful in designing structures ranking voters in voting institutions,
workers in management enterprises or device components. Examples in these different
contexts can be found in [1, 24, 30, 33, 37].
Besides this more general motivation for our studies, the paper contributes to the
classification of simple games or more generally voting systems initiated in the classical
monograph [32] by von Neumann and Morgenstern. Here we enumerate some classes of
complete simple games, i.e. special classes of voting systems in which each player casts
a “yes” or a “no” vote, and the outcome is a collective “yes” or “no” decision, with
distinguished types of voters. We address our attention to complete simple games with
at least one of the six types of voters: dictators, veto players, passers, null players, semi-
veto players, or semi-passers, see Subsection 1.1 for the precise definitions. As far as we
know the last two types have not been considered before in voting literature.
The structures under study, complete simple games, have interest in several different
fields apart from voting although we adopt in this paper the standard voting background.
Fields for which these structures are of interest are: circuits, clusters, threshold logic,
cryptography, reliability or neural networks among others, see e.g. [41] for an overview.
Recently simple games were studied using binary decision diagrams, see e.g. [3, 4].
Special types of voters in simple games were also considered in [34]. Complexity
results for identifying some of the proposed distinguished types of voters can be found
in [2].
1.1. The basics of simple games
In this section we briefly state the basic definitions of the examined voting systems.
For more background material we refer to [41].
One of the most general class of voting systems, in which a single alternative, such as
a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo, is given by the class of so-called
simple games.
Definition 1. A simple game is a pair (N,W ) in which N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and W is a
collection of subsets of N that satisfies: N ∈W , ∅ /∈W and, the monotonicity property,
if S ∈W and S ⊆ T ⊆ N then T ∈W .
The set N is called the grand coalition. Members of N are called players or voters,
and subsets of N are called coalitions, the coalitions that belong to W are called winning
coalitions. The subfamily of minimal winning coalitions Wm = {S ∈ W : ∀T ⊂ S ⇒
T /∈ W} determines the game. The subsets of N that are in 2N \W are called losing
coalitions. By |S| we mean the cardinality of a coalition S. Real–world examples of
simple games are given in [30, 39, 41] among others.
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Example 1. (i) In the former USSR the three top state officials, the President, the
Prime minister, and the Minister of Defence (Ustinov, Brezhnev, Kosygin), all
had “nuclear suitcases”. Any two of them could authorize a launch of a nuclear
warhead. No one could do it alone.2 This situation can be modeled as a simple
game with grand coalition N = {1, 2, 3} and where the set of winning coalitions
is given by W = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. Thus, the set of minimal winning
coalitions is given by Wm = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
(ii) Let (N,W ) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and W = {S ⊆ N : |S| ≥ 3, S 6= {3, 4, 5}}. It
is easy to check that Wm = {S ⊆ N : |S| = 3, S 6= {3, 4, 5}}.
The monotonicity property of simple games is some kind of a universal base as-
sumption for voting systems. Most of the systems used in practice satisfy additional
requirements. One common idea is the concept of influence, i.e. that a particular voting
system may give one voter more influence than another. The so-called “desirability”
relation defined on the set of voters represents a way to make this precise. Isbell already
used it in [23].
Definition 2. Let (N,W ) be a simple game.
(i) Player i is at least as desirable as j (i % j, in short) in (N,W ) if:
S ∪ {j} ∈W ⇒ S ∪ {i} ∈W, for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
(ii) Players i and j are equally desirable (i ≈ j, in short) in (N,W ) if: i % j and j % i.
(iii) Player i is strictly more desirable than player j (i  j, in short) in (N,W ) if: i % j
and i ≈/ j.
In Example 1-(i) players 1, 2 and 3 are equally desirable. In Example 1-(ii) players 1
and 2 are equally desirable, players 3, 4 and 5 are equally desirable and player i is strictly
more desirable than player j for all i = 1, 2 and j = 3, 4, 5. The ≈-relation partitions the
set of voters into equivalence classes Ni. We say that the voters in the same equivalence
class have the same influence and belong to the same type (of voters). We also speak of
the number of types, t, of voters meaning the number of equivalence classes. E.g. t = 1
in Example 1-(i), whereas we have t = 2 in Example 1-(ii).
Definition 3. A simple game (N,W ) is complete or linear if the desirability relation is
a complete preordering.
From now on we only consider complete simple games, abbreviated complete games,
and w.l.o.g. we assume 1 % · · · % n in the following, i.e. completeness of the desirability
relation on (N,W ) with player 1 being the strongest and player n being the weakest by
the desirability relation.
The two voting systems described in Example 1 are complete games and we have:
1 ≈ 2 ≈ 3 in Example 1-(i) and 1 ≈ 2  3 ≈ 4 ≈ 5 in Example 1-(ii). In this latter case
N decomposes into the two equivalence classes: N1 = {1, 2} and N2 = {3, 4, 5}.
2Example taken from the presentation “Secret sharing schemes and complete simple games” by
Arkadii Slinko.
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Example 2. A simple game (N,W ) is a weighted game if there exists a vector of weights
with non-negative components w = (w1, . . . , wn) such that∑
i∈S
wi >
∑
j∈T
wj , for all S ∈W and T /∈W.
All weighted games are complete, because wi ≥ wj implies i % j. We have wi > wj if
i  j, but not necessarily wi = wj if i ≈ j.
In a weighted game a quota q may be inserted between b = min
S∈W
∑
i∈S
wi and a =
max
T /∈W
∑
j∈T
wj , i.e. any q ∈ (a, b] separates the weights of winning coalitions from the
weights of losing coalitions. As short-hand notation we use [q;w1, . . . , wn] for an ar-
bitrary representation of a weighted game. There is an infinite number of representa-
tions for a weighted game with different weights, because [q;w1, . . . , wn] is equivalent to
[c · q; c · w1, . . . , c · wn] for all c > 0.
The voting system from Example 1-(i) is weighted and a representation for it is given
by [2; 1, 1, 1]. The voting system from Example 1-(ii) is weighted and a representation
for it is given by [7; 3, 3, 2, 2, 2]. For more than 5 voters one can easily find examples
of complete games that are not weighted. Many of the real-world voting systems are
weighted games (or at least can be represented as the intersection of two or three weighted
games). We remark that every simple game is the intersection of a finite number, the
minimal number is called its dimension, of weighted games, see [41] and [15] for some
results on the dimension of complete games and simple games.
Most well-known voting systems in use are complete:
Example 3. (i) A system to amend the Canadian Constitution used in the sixties
and studied in Kilgour [25] is an example of a complete game with two types
of voters. In this example: |N | = 10, the elements of N are the ten Canadian
provinces and Wm = {S ⊆ N : |S| = 7 and S ∩ {1, 2} 6= ∅}. It is then obvious N
decomposes into N1 = {1, 2}, representing the provinces of Ontario and Quebec,
and N2 = {3, . . . , 10}. This voting system is complete but not weighted and has
dimension 2, see [39] for details.
(ii) A typical example of an important complete voting system is the United Nations
Security Council. The voters in this system are the fifteen countries that make up
the Security Council, five of which are permanent members whereas the other ten
are non-permanent members. Passage requires a total of at least nine of the fifteen
possible votes, subject to a veto due to a nay vote from any one of the five permanent
members. In this example: |N | = 15, Wm = {S ⊆ N : |S| = 9 and {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} ⊆
S}. It is then obvious that N decomposes into N1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, i.e. the five
permanent nations in the Council: USA, China, France, Russia and the United
Kingdom, and N2 = {6, . . . , 15}. The elements of N1 are exactly the veto players.
This voting system is weighted with representation:
[39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]
This model ignores abstention, for a treatment of this example considering the
possibility of abstention we refer the reader to [18].
4
(iii) All voting systems successively used by the European Economic Community since
1958 are complete. As an example we mention the early European Economic Com-
munity between 1958 and 1973. The six founders were West Germany, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. At that time the voting procedure was
applied by using the following representation as a weighted game [12; 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1],
which is equivalent to [6; 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0]. See e.g. [29] for an analysis of all the voting
systems for the EU councils of ministers up to now.
An interest of complete games has emerged recently in the field of Cryptography. In-
deed, the access structure in a secret sharing (see e.g., Stinson [36]) can also be modeled
by a simple game. To this end Simmons [35] introduced the concept of a hierarchical
access structure. Gvozdeva et al. [19] study complete games with only one shift-minimal
winning coalition (see next definition) and observe that they are isomorphic concepts to
conjunctive and disjunctive (for the dual game) hierarchically access structures. More-
over, both conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchically access structures have been proved
to be ideal (Tassa [38]) which means they can carry the most informationally efficient
secret sharing scheme and be completely secure (i.e., not giving any information about
the secret to unauthorized coalitions).
Definition 4. In a simple game (N,W ) a coalition S is shift-minimal winning if S ∈Wm
and (S \ {i}) ∪ {j} /∈ W for all i ∈ S and j /∈ S with i  j. Let W s denote the set of
shift-minimal winning coalitions.
Note that a winning coalition can be minimal but not necessarily shift-minimal.
E.g. in Example 1-(ii) Wm \ W s = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}} and Wm \ W s =
{S ∪ {1, 2} with |S| = 5 and S ⊆ N \ {1, 2}} for the voting system to amend the
Canadian Constitution described in [25]. For the remaining examples described above
we have Wm = W s.
While most of the common voting systems consist of many types of equivalent voters,
examples with only few types of voters are not that artificial as one might think at the
first moment. As the structural properties of voting systems with few types of voters seem
to be more accessible, they are also a good starting point for theoretical considerations.
The enumeration of such voting structures is indeed the target of our study. In the field of
Boolean algebra, complete games correspond to 2-monotonic positive Boolean functions,
which were already considered in [22]. The problem of identifying this type of functions
by using polynomial-time recognition has been treated in [5, 6].
We introduce some distinguished types of voters for simple games.
Definition 5. Let (N,W ) be a simple game.
i) i ∈ N is a dictator in (N,W ) if Wm = {{i}},
ii) i ∈ N has veto in (N,W ) if i ∈ S for all S ∈W ,
iii) i ∈ N is a passer in (N,W ) if {i} ∈W ,
iv) i ∈ N is null in (N,W ) if i /∈ S for all S ∈Wm,
v) i ∈ N has semi-veto in (N,W ) if N \{i} ∈W and S ∈W implies either S = N \{i}
or i ∈ S.
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vi) i ∈ N is a semi-passer in (N,W ) if {i, j} ∈W for all j ∈ N \ {i}, but {i} /∈W .
All three players in the complete game of Example 1-(i) are both semi-vetoes and
semi-passers. Permanent nations of Example 1-(ii) have veto right and Luxembourg in
Example 1-(iii) is a null player.
If a game has a dictator, the dictator is the unique player with this status and the
remaining players are null voters. Being a dictator is the most radical form of having
veto and of being a passer. A player have veto and is a passer if and only if the game is
the dictatorship of this player. Thus, veto and passers are pairwise incompatible in the
same game if this is not the dictatorship of a voter. If some of these types of voters are
present in the game, then they form an equivalence class N1 whose members dominate
by the desirability relation all the other players in N . On the other hand, it is obvious
that if n = 1 there cannot be null voters; if n > 1 and the game has null voters they
form an equivalence class Nt whose members are dominated by the desirability relation
for any other player in N .
It is also obvious from Definition 5 that veto and semi-veto (or passer and semi-passer)
voters can concur in the same game, while veto and semi-passer or passer and semi-veto
cannot concur in the same game (if we assume that their roles are taken by different
players). Semi-vetoes belong to the same equivalence class N1 which is the strongest
one by the desirability relation if the game has no veto players, while they belong to the
second class N2 if the game has veto players, and similarly for semi-passers and passers.
Finally, the concurrence of semi-vetoes and nulls in the same game, and similarly, the
concurrence of semi-passers and nulls in the same game is not possible.
In summary, if a game has either a dictator, veto players or passers they are the
strongest players in the game and belong to the most powerful equivalence class; if a
game has null voters they are the weakest players in the game and belong to the least
powerful class of the game.3 If a game has veto and semi-veto players or passers and
semi-passers, the semi-vetoes and semi-passers are the second strongest players in the
game, while in the absence of veto and passers they are the most strongest players in the
game.
Definition 6. The dual game (N,W ∗) of a simple game (N,W ) is defined by W ∗ =
{S ⊆ N : N \ S /∈W}.
Hence, to win in the dual game is to block in the original one (S is blocking in (N,W ) if
N \ S /∈W ). It is easy to verify that: (W ∗)∗ = W , ∗ =  and ≈∗ = ≈, thus %∗ = %,
and a game is complete if and only if the dual is.
From the definition of dual game, it easily follows that:
1. If (N,W ) is the dictatorship of player i, then (N,W ) = (N,W ∗);
2. Voter i ∈ N has veto in (N,W ) if and only if voter i ∈ N is a passer in (N,W ∗);
3. Voter i ∈ N is null in (N,W ) if and only if voter i ∈ N is null in (N,W ∗);
4. Voter i ∈ N has semi-veto in (N,W ) if and only if voter i ∈ N is a semi-passer in
(N,W ∗).
3Almost all power indices respect the desirability relation, e.g. the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf or John-
ston indices [10], [12], and [28]. Thus belonging to the strongest class in the game means being one of
the most powerful players, and belonging to the weakest class in the game means being one of the least
powerful players in the game.
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1.2. Related work
One of the first and most prominent enumeration results on simple games, a super
class of complete games, is May’s Theorem for Simple Games [31] stating that the number
of simple games with n voters for simple majority decisions equals one4. If only anony-
mous or symmetric (i.e. any pair of voters are equally desirable) voters are considered
for simple games with n voters we get
SG(n, 1) = CG(n, 1) = WG(n, 1) = n.
Here SG(n, t) denotes the number of simple games, CG(n, t) the number of complete
games, and WG(n, t) the number of weighted voting games with n voters from t different
types of equivalent voters.
The number CG(n, 2) of complete games with n voters belonging to exactly two types
of voters were recently enumerated in [14] and later on in [27], giving a simpler proof:
CG(n, 2) = F (n+ 6)− (n2 + 4n+ 8) ∈ Θ
((
1 +
√
5
2
)n)
, (1)
where F (n) are the Fibonacci numbers which constitute a well–known sequence of integer
numbers defined by the following recurrence relation: F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and F (n) =
F (n− 1) + F (n− 2) for all n > 1.
By a type of shift-minimal winning coalitions we mean a set of shift-minimal win-
ning coalitions such that any coalition in the set can be converted into any other coali-
tion in the set by only swapping equally desirable players. The number of complete
games with one shift-minimal winning coalitions, see e.g. [7, 19], was determined in [16]:∑n
t=1 CG(n, t, 1) = 2
n−1, where CG(n, t, r) denotes the number of complete games with
n voters, t equivalent types of voters, and r shift-minimal winning coalitions. For com-
plete games with two shift-minimal winning coalitions a more complicated enumeration
formula was determined in [27]. For given values of the parameters t and r it is possible
to compute an exact enumeration formula for CG(n, t, r) based on the parametric Barvi-
nok algorithm and a tailored decomposition of a certain linear programming formulation
for complete games, see [27]. We remark that the exact numbers of simple games are
known up to n = 8 voters and the exact number of complete games or weighted games
are known up to n = 9 voters, see e.g. [26, 27].
1.3. Our contribution
We establish bijections among several classes of complete games containing at least
one of the mentioned distinguished types of players, and obtain exact enumerations for
these games with less than four types of equivalent voters and for four types whenever
null voters are present with either veto players or passers. While these enumerations are
polynomial for only two types of voters, they follow a Fibonacci sequence modified by a
polynomial expression. So Fibonacci sequences and the golden number are in the core of
these enumerations. The obtained sequences in this paper have not yet appeared in the
On-line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences (http://oeis.org/).
4May originally considered a slightly different setting of anonymous voting systems for two alternatives
that are neutral, i.e. there is no built-in bias towards “yes” or “no” outcomes.
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1.4. Organization of the paper
In Subsection 1.1 we briefly recalled some necessary background on simple games,
complete games, i.e. the examined voting systems, and some types of players. To get the
results in the present paper we will make use of one additional previous result, besides the
enumeration of CG(n, 2), namely a parametrization for complete games given in [7], which
we will restate in Section 2. In Section 3 we prove that four classes of complete games
with voters being very powerful or being nulls have all the same cardinality, additionally
a closed formula on the number of voters is given for the number of these games as long
as the number of types of voters is less than 4. The main tool to that end is Theorem 2
stating bijections between complete games containing at least one of the distinguished
types of voters. In Section 4 we consider the case of complete games containing at least
two of the distinguished types of voters. Finally, we end with a conclusion and some
remarks on future research in Section 6.
2. Characteristic invariants of complete simple games
In this section we mainly describe the parametrization in [7] that will be used in the
remaining of the paper. The relations % and ≈ can be easily generalized to coalitions:
• S ≈c T if and only if S may be transformed into T by only changing equally
desirable players, and
• S %c T if and only if T = ∅ or for each player j ∈ T there is a (distinct)5 player
i ∈ S with i % j.
Relations ≈c and %c for coalitions are, respectively, extensions of ≈ and % in the
sense that, for example, i % j if and only if {i} %c {j}. We remark that ≈c can occur
for coalitions of the same size only, while %c can compare coalitions of different sizes.
Moreover, ≈c is the equivalence relation associated with %c, and therefore %c induces
an ordering  in the quotient set 2N = 2N/ ≈c. The ≈c-class of a coalition S ⊆ N will
be denoted by S. Observe that if: S ≈c T , then:
1. S ∈W s if and only if T ∈W s,
2. S ∈Wm if and only if T ∈Wm, and
3. S ∈W if and only if T ∈W .
If T %c S and S ∈W , then T ∈W .
If (N,W ) is a simple game and N1, . . . , Nt are the ≈c-classes of the game and have
cardinalities n1, . . . , nt. Then we have:
(a) S ≈c T if and only if |S ∩Nk| = |T ∩Nk| for all k.
(b) For every S ∈ 2N , the numbers sk = |S ∩Nk| do not depend on the representative
S, and satisfy 0 ≤ sk ≤ nk for all k.
(c) Conversely, any vector s = (s1, . . . , st) such that 0 ≤ sk ≤ nk for all k defines a
unique ≈c-class S ∈ 2N .
5i.e., once player i ∈ S is used for j ∈ T it cannot be used again for any other player k ∈ T \ {j}.
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The vector s is called the vector of indices associated with S: it provides the common
model, in terms of equally desirable players, of all coalitions belonging to S. For instance,
in Example 1-(i), the vector of indices (2) is associated with {1, 2}, where {1, 2} =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
N will denote the set of natural numbers. If n ∈ Nt, we consider Λ(n) = {s ∈
(N∪ {0})t : n ≥ s}, where ≥ stands for the ordinary componentwise ordering, i.e. s ≥ r
if and only if sk ≥ rk for k = 1, . . . , t. Thus, if n = (n1, . . . , nt), Λ(n) consists of all
vectors s = (s1, . . . , st) whose components are integer and satisfy 0 ≤ sk ≤ nk for all k.
We need to consider not only the ordering ≥, but also the weaker ordering δ given by
comparison of partial sums; that is,
s δ r if and only if
k∑
i=1
si ≥
k∑
i=1
ri for 1 ≤ k ≤ t.
If s δ r it is said that s dominates r. For instance, in Example 1-(ii) we have
Λ((2, 3)) = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2), (0, 3), (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3)}.
If (N,W ) is a complete game, following Theorem 3.1 in [7], let N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt be
the linear ordering of the ≈-classes and let n = (n1, n2, . . . , nt) be the vector defined by
their cardinalities. Then the map ψ : (2N ,)→ (Λ(n), δ), which assigns to each ≈-class
S the vector of indices s = (s1, s2, . . . , st) is an isomorphism of ordered sets.
The pair (Λ(n), δ) is called the lattice associated with the complete game (N,W ), and
says that s = ψ(S) is the model of coalition S. The sets
W = {S ∈ 2N : S ∈W}, Wm = {S ∈ 2N : S ∈Wm}, W s = {S ∈ 2N : S ∈W s}.
are well defined and contain respectively, the classes of winning, minimal winning and
shift-minimal winning coalitions6 of the game. For a complete game, W s gives enough
information to reconstruct the game. For instance in Example 1-(ii) we have
ψ(W ) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3)}, ψ(Wm) = {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, ψ(W s) = {(1, 2)}.
Two simple games are essentially the same if they only vary by a change (formally a
permutation) in the names assigned to players.
Definition 7. Two simple games (N,W ) and (N ′,W ′) are said to be isomorphic if there
is a bijective map f : N → N ′ such that S ∈W if and only if f(S) ∈W ′; f is called an
isomorphism of simple games.
In the following we restate a known parametrization result of complete games up to
isomorphism, which has three parts. The first part shows how to associate a vector n
and a matrix M to a complete game (N,W ) and describes the restrictions that these
parameters need to fulfill. The second part establishes that isomorphic complete games
(N,W ) and (N ′,W ′) correspond to the same associated vector n and matrixM (unique-
ness). The third part shows that a vector n and a matrix M fulfilling the conditions in
Part A correspond to a complete game (N,W ) (existence).
6In [7] the shift-minimal winning coalitions are called δ-minimal winning coalitions, because they are
minimal winning for relation δ in Λ(n).
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Theorem 1. (Carreras and Freixas’ Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in [7]) Let (N,W ) be a com-
plete game with t equivalence ≈-classes of voters N1 > · · · > Nt, and let n = (n1, . . . , nt)
be the vector defined by their cardinalities. Let
M =
 m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t... ... . . . ...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t

be the matrix whose rows mp = (mp,1, . . . ,mp,t) are the models of shift-minimal winning
coalitions, i.e. the vectors of indices associated to the ≈c-classes S1, S2, . . . , Sr found in
W s. We also assume in what follows that the rows (if r ≥ 2) of M are lexicographically
ordered by partial sums, i.e. if p < q, then there exists some minimum element k (1 ≤
k ≤ t− 1) such that mp,k > mq,k and mp,i = mq,i for all i < k. The pair n,M) is called
the characteristic invariant of the complete simple game (N,W ).
Part A The vector n and the matrixM associated with a complete game (N,W ) satisfy
the following properties:
1. nk > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , t;
2. 0 ≤ mp ≤ n for p = 1, . . . , r, and m1,1 > 0
3. mp and mq are not δ-comparable for all p 6= q; and
4. if t > 1 then for every k < t there exists some p such that7
mp,k > 0, mp,k+1 < nk+1.
Part B (Uniqueness) Two complete games (N,W ) and (N ′,W ′) are isomorphic if and
only if n = n′ and M =M′.
Part C (Existence) Given a vector n and a matrix M satisfying the conditions of Part
A, there exists a complete game (N,W ) the characteristic invariants of which are
n and M.
Example 4. (Examples 1 and 3 revisited) From the equivalence classes, its total or-
dering and the shift-minimal winning coalitions, we may easily derive the characteristic
invariants for all the games considered above.
(a) The system employed in the former USSR for an hypothetical launch of a nuclear
warhead, the game considered in Example 1-(i), may be characterized by n = (3)
and M = (2).
(b) The game considered in Example 1-(ii) may be characterized by n = (2, 3) and
M = (1 2).
(c) The voting system to amend the Canadian Constitution used in the sixties, see
Example 3-(i), may be simply described by n = (2, 8) and M = (1 6).
(d) The voting system of the United Nations Organization, Example 3-(ii), may be
simply described by n = (5, 10) and M = (5 4).
7The lexicographic ordering chosen guarantees uniqueness under permutation of rows. This lexico-
graphic ordering is a plausible election which could be replaced for other alternative criteria.
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(e) The voting systems for the early European Economic Community between 1958
and 1973 considered in Example 3-(iii) may be simply described by n = (3, 2, 1)
and M =
(
3 0 0
2 2 0
)
.
Theorem 1 is a parametrization theorem because it allows one to enumerate all com-
plete games up to isomorphism by listing the possible values of certain invariants. Based
on this it is possible to compute an explicit enumeration formula for the number of com-
plete games with n voters if the parameters t and r, i.e. the number of columns and rows
of M, are specified (but arbitrary), see [27]. This paper goes more deeply into the issue
of enumerations for special cases without assuming information on r.
2.1. Special forms of the characteristic invariants of complete simple games
From now on we identify complete games with their characteristic invariants. This
convention will be used in the remainder of the paper.
If a complete game has special types of voters, as those introduced in Definition 5, then
the characteristic invariants, (n,M), that define it (and therefore fulfill the properties in
Theorem 1-(A)) have specific forms. In the next seven lemmas, which will be intensively
used in the following section, we consider the specific form of the characteristic invariants
for complete games. Recall that
t∑
i=1
ni = n hereafter.
The proofs of the next lemmas are left to the reader, they all follow from Definition 5
and from conditions of part A in Theorem 1. After stating them, we proceed to prove
just one of them: Lemma 5. The proof of Lemma 6 is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.
The proofs for the other lemmas are shorter and easier.
Lemma 1. If the game has a dictator then t = 2, n = (1, n− 1) and matrix M has the
form: M = (1 0) .
Note that the set of minimal winning coalitions for the game is Wm = {{1}} indepen-
dently of the number of players.
Lemma 2. If the game has k veto players then k = n1 and matrix M has the form:
M = (n) if t = 1, M = (n1 a) with a < n2 if t = 2, and
M =

n1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
n1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
n1 mr,2 . . . mr,t
 (2)
with m1,2 > 0 if t > 2.
Note that if t = 1, the game is the unanimity game given by W = {{1, 2, . . . , n}}. If
t = 2, the game is Wm = {N1 ∪ S, for all S ⊆ N2 and |S| = a} for some 0 ≤ a < n2.
Lemma 3. If the game has k passers then k = n1 and matrixM has the form: M = (1)
if t = 1,
M =
(
1 0
0 b
)
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with n2 > 1 and b > 1 if t = 2, and
M =

1 0 . . . 0
0 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
0 mr,2 . . . mr,t
 (3)
with m2,2 > 0 if t > 2.
Note that if t = 1, the game is given by Wm = {{1}, . . . , {n}}. If t = 2, the game is
given by Wm = {{1} ∪ S, for all S ⊆ N2 and |S| = b} for some 0 < b ≤ n2.
Lemma 4. If the game has k null voters then t > 1, k = nt and matrixM has the form:
M = (c 0) for some c > 0 if t = 2, and
M =

m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t−1 0
m2,1 m2,2 . . . m2,t−1 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t−1 0

if t > 2.
Note that if t = 2, the game is given by Wm = {S ⊆ N1 : |S| = c} for some 0 < c ≤ n1.
Lemma 5. If the game has k1 vetoes and k2 semi-vetoes then k1 = n1, k2 = n2 and
matrix M has the form: M = (n1 n2 − 1) if t = 2, the form
M =
(
n1 n2 c
n1 n2 − 1 n3
)
with n3 > 1 and c < n3 − 1 if t = 3, and the form
M =

n1 n2 m1,3 . . . m1,t−1 m1,t
n1 n2 m2,3 . . . m2,t−1 m2,t
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
n1 n2 mr−1,3 . . . mr−1,t−1 mr−1,t
n1 n2 − 1 n3 . . . nt−1 nt

if t > 3.
If the game has no vetoes but k semi-vetoes then k = n1 and matrix M has the form:
M = (n− 1) if t = 1,
M =
(
n1 a
n1 − 1 n2
)
with n2 > 1 and a < n2 − 1 if t = 2, and the form
M =

n1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
n1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
n1 mr−1,2 . . . mr−1,t
n1 − 1 n2 · · · nt

if t > 2.
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Note that if t = 2 the game is given by Wm =
⋃
i∈N2
N \ {i}. If t = 3, the game is given
by Wm = {N \ {i} : for all i ∈ N \ N1} ∪ {N \ S : S ⊆ N3, |S| = n3 − c} for some
0 ≤ c < n3 − 1.
Lemma 6. If the game has k1 passers and k2 semi-passers then k1 = n1, k2 = n2 and
matrix M has the form:
M = ( 1 0 )
if t = 2 and n2 = 1 or
M =
(
1 0
0 2
)
if t = 2 and n2 > 1,
M =
(
1 0 0
0 1 1
)
with n3 > 1 if t = 3 or
M =
 1 0 00 1 1
0 0 b

with b > 2 and n3 > 2 if t = 3, and
M =

1 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0 1
0 0 m3,3 . . . m3,t−1 m3,t
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 mr,3 . . . mr,t−1 mr,t

if t > 3.
Note that if t = 2 and n2 = 1, the game is given by W
m = {{i}, i ∈ N \ {n}}. If t = 2
and n2 > 1 the game is given by W
m = {{i}, i ∈ N1} ∪ {{j, k}, j, k ∈ N2, j 6= k}.
Lemma 7. If the game has no passers but k semi-passers then k = n1 and matrix M
has the form: M = (2) if t = 1, (
1 1
0 c
)
with n2 > 2 and c ≥ 3 if t = 2, and the form
1 0 . . . 0 1
0 m2,2 . . . m2,t−1 m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 mr,2 · · · mr,t−1 mr,t

if t > 2.
Note that if t = 1, we have the game given by Wm = {{i, j}, i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. If t = 2, we
have that the game is given by Wm = {{i, j}, i ∈ N1, j ∈ N, i 6= j}∪{S ⊆ N2 : |S| = c}
for some c ≥ 3.
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case contained type # games # games with t types
i dictator CGD(n) CGD(n, t)
ii veto CGV(n) CGV(n, t)
iii passer CGP(n) CGP(n, t)
iv null CGN(n) CGN(n, t)
v semi-veto CGSV(n) CGSV(n, t)
vi semi-passer CGSP(n) CGSP(n, t)
Table 1: Number of complete games with one distinguished type of voters.
Proof. Lemma 5:
The game has k1 vetoes. Hence, the vetoes belong to all winning coalitions and
therefore they dominate all the other players by the desirability relation, i.e. i % j for
all j ∈ N if i has veto right, and the relation is strict if j does not have veto right. Thus,
vetoes belong to the strongest equivalence class, k1 = n1 and mk,1 = n1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r
in M, otherwise if mk,1 < nk for some k, it would exist a winning coalition S ⊆ N with
vector mk and with i /∈ S for some veto player i, which would be a contradiction.
The game also have k2 semi-vetoes. The semi-vetoes belong to the second strongest
equivalence class because they are strictly dominated by veto players and they strictly
dominate all the remaining players. Indeed, if i is a semi-veto player and j is neither a
veto player nor a semi-veto, then N \ {j} /∈ W , otherwise W ⊆ {S ⊆ N : j ∈ S}, and
then j would have veto right, which would be a contradiction. Hence, N \ {j} ∈ W .
Then, S ∪ {j} ∈ W implies S ∪ {i} ∈ W for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, and T ∪ {j} /∈ W and
T ∪ {i} ∈ W for at least a coalition T (otherwise j would be a semi-veto). Therefore,
k2 = n2, mk,2 = n2 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r− 1, mr,2 = n2− 1 and mr,i = ni for all i = 3, . . . , t.
The latter condition follows from the fact that for a semi-veto player: N \ {i} is the
unique losing coalition without containing player i. 
3. Enumerations for complete simple games with either the most powerful
voters or the least powerful – one distinguished type of voters
In Definition 5 we have exposed six distinguished types of voters. In this section we
will consider complete games containing at least one of those six special types of voters.
To this end we introduce some notation in Table 1. So CGV (n) e.g. represents the number
of complete games with n players and at least one veto player. If the number of different
types additionally is restricted we denote the corresponding number by CGV (n, t). If
we want to address the respective set of objects instead of their number we use the
corresponding curly literals, i.e. CGD(n) CGV(n), CGP(n), CGN (n) CGSV(n), CGSP(n)
and CGD(n, t) CGV(n, t), CGP(n, t), CGN (n, t) CGSV(n, t), CGSP(n, t).
The condition that a complete game contains a dictator is very restrictive. Due to
our assumption on the ordering of the players, the first player is a dictator and the set
of minimal winning coalitions is given by Wm =
{{1}}. All other players then have to
be null voters. Thus we have t = 2, n1 = 1, n2 = n− 1 and M = ( 1 0 ) unless n = 1.
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Lemma 8. CGD(n) = 1 for n ≥ 1 and GCD(n, t) =
 1 if t = 1, n = 1,1 if t = 2, n ≥ 2,
0 otherwise.
The remaining five classes of complete games with one of the distinguished types
of voters are pairwise in one–to–one correspondence and therefore their cardinalities
coincide.
Theorem 2. For all positive integers n and t there is a bijection among the sets of
complete games
CGV(n, t), CGP(n, t), CGSV(n, t), CGSP(n, t)
and for all positive integers n and t > 1 there is a bijection between any of these four
classes of games and CGN (n, t).
Proof. Assume t = 1, then n = (n) for any complete game with n voters. There is only
one complete game with veto M = (n), only one complete game with passers M = (1),
only one complete game with semi-veto players M = (n − 1), and only one complete
game with semi-passers M = (2).
Thus, the pairwise bijections between pairs of sets CGV(n, 1), CGP(n, 1), CGSV(n, 1)
and CGSP(n, 1) are clear.
Assume from now on that t > 1. We define a bijection f from CGV(n, t) to CGN (n, t);
a bijection g from CGP(n, t) to CGN (n, t); a bijection h from CGV(n, t) to CGSV(n, t)
and a bijection k from CGP(n, t) to CGSP(n, t). Of course, any other bijection is a
composition of some of these bijections or their inverses.
1. Definition of a bijection f between CGV(n, t) and CGN (n, t).
Let (n,M) ∈ CGV(n, t) be the characteristic invariants of a complete game with
t types of voters having a veto. Let n = (n1, n2, . . . , nt) and mi,j be the components
of M as defined in Equation (2) with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t and mi,1 = n1 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ r because the game has veto players.
In order to define the bijection f , we distinguish two separate cases:
(i) The game has no null voters.
Then, f sends vector (n1, n2, n3, . . . , nt) to vector (n2, n3, . . . , nt, n1) and ma-
trix M to matrix M′ where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1 the elements
of M′ are defined as m′i,j = mi,j+1, whereas m′i,t = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. That
is,
M′ =

m1,2 . . . m1,t 0
m2,2 . . . m2,t 0
...
. . .
...
...
mr,2 . . . mr,t 0
 . (4)
(ii) The game has null voters.
Then, f is the identity.
Now we need to check that:
(a) The map f is well–defined.
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(b) The map f is injective.
(c) The map f is surjective.
Well-defined. We have to prove that f(n,M) ∈ CGN (n, t). This is trivially true if
(n,M) has null voters. Otherwise, let f(n,M) = (n′,M′) where M′ is defined as
in Equation (4). Then this pair fulfills the conditions established in Theorem 1-(A),
n′ has t components and m′i,t = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r guarantees the presence of null
voters. Hence, (n′,M′) ∈ CGN (n, t).
Injective. Let (n,M), (m,P) ∈ CGV(n, t) with f(n,M) = f(m,P). If f(n,M) has
null voters then (n,M) = f(n,M) = f(m,P) = (m,P). Otherwise, let f(n,M) =
f(m,P) = (h,Q), then
h = (h1, h2, . . . , ht−1, ht) = (n2, . . . , nt, n1) = (m2, . . . ,mt,m1),
thus nj = mj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t and we have n = m; moreover
qi,j = mi,j+1 = pi,j+1 for all i, and for all j < t.
ThusM and P have the same dimensions and their components coincide, with the
possible exceptions of the components appearing in their respective first columns,
but (n,M), (m,P) ∈ CGV(n, t) guarantees that all of them are equal to n1 and
therefore M = P.
Surjective. Let (m,P) ∈ CGN (n, t). If it has veto players then (m,P) ∈ CGV(n, t)
and f(m,P) = (m,P). Otherwise, consider (n,M) defined as follows:
n1 = mt, ni = mi−1 for 1 < i ≤ t,
mi,1 = mt for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, mi,j = pi,j−1 for 1 < j ≤ t.
The pair (n,M) fulfills the conditions of Theorem 1-(A) and has veto players,
therefore (n,M) ∈ CGV(n, t); and f(n,M) = (m,P).
2. Definition of a bijection g from CGP(n, t) to CGN (n, t).
Let (n,M) ∈ CGP(n, t) be the characteristic invariants of a complete game with t
types having passers. Let n = (n1, n2, . . . , nt) and mi,j be the components of M
as defined in Equation (3) with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t and m1,1 = 1, m1,j = 0 if
j > 1 and mi,1 = 0 if i > 1 because the game has passers.
In order to define the bijection g, we distinguish two separate cases:
(i) The game has no null voters.
Then, g sends vector (n1, n2, n3, . . . , nt) to vector (n2, n3, . . . , nt, n1) and ma-
trix M to matrix M′ with r − 1 rows, where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 and
1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1 the elements of M′ are defined as m′i,j = mi+1,j+1, whereas
m′i,t = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. That is,
M′ =

m2,2 . . . m2,t 0
m3,2 . . . m3,t 0
...
. . .
...
...
mr,2 . . . mr,t 0
 (5)
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(ii) The game has null voters.
Then, g is the identity.
Well-defined. All the rows ofM are not pairwise δ-comparable because they fulfill
the conditions in Theorem 1-(A), as the game has n1 vetoes, the first common
component n1 of all the rows has no effect on these comparisons. Thus, the rows
of M′ are not pairwise δ-comparable and therefore the pair (n′,M′) fulfills the
conditions in Theorem 1-(A) and g turns the n1 vetoes into n1 nulls. Therefore,
(n,M′) ∈ CGN (n, t).
The proof that g is injective and surjective follows the same guidelines as for f .
3. Definition of a bijection h from CGV(n, t) to CGSV(n, t).
Let (n,M) ∈ CGV(n, t) be the characteristic invariants of a complete game with t
types of voters having at least one veto player. Let n = (n1, n2, . . . , nt) and mi,j
be the components of M as defined in Equation (2) with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t
and mi,1 = n1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r because the game has veto players.
In order to define the bijection h, we distinguish two separate cases:
(i) The game has no semi-vetoes.
Then, h leaves invariant the vector (n1, . . . , nt) and adds a last row in M
which is (n1 − 1, n2, . . . , nt) getting M′, i.e. this addition converts the n1
vetoes into n1 semi-vetoes since N \ {i} for all i ∈ N1 turns into a winning
coalition.
(ii) The game has semi-vetoes.
Then, h is the identity.
Well-defined. Each row of M, which is also a row of M′, dominates the new last
row of M′ because the first component of the former rows are equal to n1 which
is greater than n1 − 1. Moreover,
∑t
i=1mk,i < n − 1 for all k = 1, . . . , r since∑t
i=1mk,i = n − 1 would imply that coalition N \ {i} for all i ∈ N1 would be
winning in the original complete game (n,M), which is a contradiction with the
non-existence of semi-vetoes. Thus, h(n,M) = (n,M′) fulfills the conditions of
Theorem 1-(A) and h turns the n1 vetoes into n1 semi-vetoes. Therefore, (n,M′) ∈
CGSV(n, t).
The proof that h is injective and surjective follows the same guidelines as for f .
4. Definition of a bijection k from CGP(n, t) to CGSP(n, t)
Let (n,M) ∈ CGP(n, t) be the characteristic invariants of a complete game with
passers and with t types of voters. Let n = (n1, . . . , nt) and mi,j be the components
of M as defined in Equation (3) with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
In order to define the bijection k, we distinguish two separate cases:
(i) The game has no semi-passers.
Then, k leaves invariant vector (n1, . . . , nt) and transform the first row in
M, which is (1, 0, . . . , 0, 0), into (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1), while the rest of rows keep
invariant to get M′.
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(ii) The game has semi-passers.
Then, k is the identity.
Well-defined. Of course the first new row ofM′ dominates the other rows because
(1, 0, . . . , 0, 1) δ-dominates (1, 0, . . . , 0, 0) which δ-dominates the rest of the rows
of M′. Conversely, as the game has no semi-passers it does not have any row of
type (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1) and all of its rows δ-dominate (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1) and as mi,1 =
0 for all i > 1 it follows that each row k = 2, . . . r of M does not δ-dominate
(1, 0, . . . , 0, 1), thus they are pairwise non-δ-comparable. Thus, k(n,M) = (n,M′)
fulfills the conditions of Theorem 1-(A) and k turns the n1 passers into n1 semi-
passers. Therefore, (n,M′) ∈ CGSP(n, t).
The proof that k is injective and surjective follows the same guidelines as for f .

We remark that we had to exclude the set CGN (n) from the bijections in Theorem 2
for t = 1 since there are no simple games with only null voters due to the definition of a
simple game.
Corollary 1. For all positive integers n and t we have
CGV (n, t) = CGP (n, t) = CGSV (n, t) = CGSP (n, t).
For t > 1 we additionally have CGN(n, t) = CGV (n, t) and CGN(n, 1) = CGV (n, 1)−
1 = 0.
Having the enumeration results for complete games with n voters and at most 2
types of voters at hand, we can conclude enumeration formulas for complete games with
t < 4 types of voters, where at least one of these equivalence classes corresponds to a
distinguished type of voters. We state the results for CGV (n, t) only. Combining them
with Corollary 1 yields five simultaneous equivalent enumerations.
Proposition 1.
1. CGV (n, 1) = 1,
2. CGV (n, 2) =
n(n− 1)
2
(whenever n ≥ 2),
3. CGV (n, 3) = F (n+ 7)− 1
2
(n3 + 2n2 + 13n+ 26) (whenever n ≥ 4),
where F (n) are the Fibonacci numbers which form a sequence of integer numbers
defined by the following recurrence relation: F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and F (n) =
F (n− 1) + F (n− 2) for all n > 1.
Proof.
1. If t = 1, we have n =M = (n). Therefore CGV (n, 1) = 1.
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2. If t = 2, let n = (n1, n2) for a given game. As the game must have veto players
all the entries in the first column must be n1. As the rows of M must be non-
comparable by the δ-relation,M only should have a row with the only requirement
that m1,2 must be different from n2, otherwise all players would be equivalent and
therefore t = 1, which would be a contradiction. Thus we have
CGV (n, 2) =
n−1∑
n1=1
=n2−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
n− n1 − 1∑
m1,2=0
1 =
n(n− 1)
2
.
3. If we remove the null voters from a complete game with t types of voters (having at
least one null voter), we obtain a complete game with t− 1 types of voters without
null voters. We remark that due to the definition of a simple game it cannot consist
of null voters only. Thus we have
CGV(n, 3) =
n∑
i=1
CG(n− i, 2)−CGV(n− i, 2) =
n−2∑
i=1
CG(n− i, 2)−CGV(n− i, 2).
Inserting CGV(n, 2) =
n(n− 1)
2
and CG(n, 2) = F (n + 6) − (n2 + 4n + 8), see
Equation (1), yields
CGV(n, 3) =
n−1∑
k=2
[
F (k + 6)− k(k − 1)
2
− (k2 + 4k + 8)
]
= F (n+ 7)− 1
2
(n3 + 2n2 + 13n+ 26)

Starting with n = 4 the first ten numbers of the sequence CGV(n, 3) are
2, 11, 37, 98, 225, 470, 919, 1713, 3082, 5400.
Asymptotically we have
lim
n→∞
CGV(n, 3)
CG(n, 2)
= lim
n→∞
F (n+ 7) +O(n3)
F (n+ 6) +O(n2)
= lim
n→∞
F (n+ 7)
F (n+ 6)
=
1 +
√
5
2
.
Thus, when n is fixed and large enough, the number of complete games with three types
of voters having veto players (or semi-veto, passer, semi-passer or null voters) is almost
equal to the number of complete games with only two types of voters multiplied by
1 +
√
5
2
.
We remark that the bijections from Theorem 2 respect the property of being weighted,
which is not too hard to prove but we omit this part because it is not needed for the
purposes of this paper. Moreover, the bijections keep games within the class of so-called
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α-roughly weighted games, where the fraction of the weight of the heaviest losing coalition
divided by the weight of lightest winning coalition is at most α ≥ 1, see [20], where the
authors have introduced this as one of three hierarchies in order to classify simple games.
The special case α = 1 corresponds to the better known class of roughly-weighted games,
see e.g. [21].
4. Enumerations with two distinguished type of voters in a complete simple
game
Continuing the considerations from Section 3 we study complete games containing at
least two of the six distinguished types from Definition 5. As mentioned in the beginning
of Section 3 each complete game with a dictator contains n−1 null voters. By CGDN(n)
we denote the number of complete games with n voters containing a dictator and at
least one null and by CGDN(n, t) we denote the number of these objects additionally
restricted to exactly t types of voters. From Lemma 8 we conclude:
Lemma 9. For n ≥ 2 we have CGDN(n) = CGD(n) = 1 and
CGDN(n, t) = CGD(n, t) =
{
1 if t = 2,
0 otherwise.
For n ≤ 1 all four counts are zero.
Each dictator has also a veto and is a passer. So for each subset S ⊆ {V, P} we have
CGDSN(n) = CGDS(n) and CGDSN(n, t) = CGDS(n, t), extending the previously
used notation for the number of complete games with presence of some distinguished
types of voters in a natural way.
If a complete game containing a dictator contains a semi-veto or a semi-passer then
we have n = 2 and t = 2.
Lemma 10. For two subsets S1 ⊆ {V, P,N} and S2 ⊆ {SV, SP} with |S2| ≥ 1 we have
CGDS1S2(n) =
{
1 if n = 2,
0 otherwise
and CGDS1S2(n, t) =
{
1 if n = t = 2,
0 otherwise.
If a complete game contains a passer and a veto then these roles must be taken by
the same player, which then is a unique dictator, and for each subset S ⊆ {SV, SP,N}
we have CGVPS(n) = CGDS(n) and CGVPS(n, t) = CGDS(n, t), compare the enumer-
ation formulas in Lemma 8, Lemma 9, and Lemma 10.
Next we consider the simultaneous occurrence of a semi-veto and a semi-passer in a
complete game. By CGSVSP(n) we denote the number of complete games with n voters
containing at least one semi-veto and at least one semi-passer. By CGSVSP(n, t) we
denote the number of these objects additionally restricted to exactly t types of voters.
Here, and in the following definitions, we permit the somewhat artificial situation that
the two types of distinguished voters could be taken by the same player.
Lemma 11. For n ≥ 1 we have
CGSVSP(n) =
 0 if n = 1,2 if n = 3,
1 otherwise
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and
CGSVSP(n, t) =
 1 if t = 1, n = 3,1 if t = 2, n ≥ 2,
0 otherwise.
Proof. We assume that voter 1 is a semi-passer. From the definition of a semi-passer
we conclude {1} /∈ W , {1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n} ∈ W . For n ≥ 4 voter 1 is the unique
voter being contained in each winning coalition besides N\{i}. Thus voter 1 also has to
be the unique semi-veto and we conclude
Wm =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n}, {2, 3, . . . , n}}.
Since the simple game given byWm has the weighted representation [n−1;n−2;
n−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, . . . , 1]
it is complete. For n = 1 no simple game containing a semi-veto and a semi-passer exists.
If n = 2 and voter 1 is a semi-passer, then we have {1} /∈ W and {1, 2} ∈ W . Since
for each semi-veto player i the coalition N\{i} is winning, we conclude that voter 1 is
also a semi-veto player and {2} is a winning coalition, so that we have Wm = {{2}}.
Here player 2 is a dictator, in contrast to our usual ordering of the players. We re-
mark that player 1 is also a null voter and thus has three roles in this case. For n = 3
we have the simple games uniquely characterized by Wm =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} and
Wm =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}}. In the first case voter 1 is both the unique semi-passer and the
unique semi-veto. In the second case all three players are semi-passers and semi-vetoes.
In the third case voter 1 is the unique semi-passer and players 2 and 3 are the semi-vetoes.

We remark that all simple games with at most three voters are complete (and
weighted).
Next we consider complete games containing vetoes and semi-passers. The corre-
sponding counts are denoted by CGVSP(n) and CGVSP(n, t).
Lemma 12. For n ≥ 1 we have
CGVSP(n) =
 0 if n = 1,2 if n = 2,
1 otherwise
and CGVSP(n, t) =
 1 if t = 1, n = 2,1 if t = 2, n ≥ 2,
0 otherwise.
Proof. For n = 1 no semi-passer is possible and for n = 2 there are only three complete
games. So we can easily check that the complete simple game given by Wm =
{{1}, {2}}
does contain neither a veto player nor a semi-passer. In the complete game given by
Wm =
{{1}} voter 1 has a veto and voter 2 is a semi-passer, so that we have t = 2. In
the complete game given by Wm =
{{1, 2}} both players are semi-passers and vetoes,
so that we have t = 1.
For n ≥ 3 we assume that voter 1 is a semi-passer so that {1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n} ∈W
and {1} /∈ W . The only possible veto player is voter 1 and no further vetoes or semi-
passers can be present. Thus voter 1 forms its own equivalence class of voters N1. Since
player 1 has a veto we conclude Wm =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n}} and t = 2. 
Similarly we denote by CGPSV (n) and CGPSV (n, t) the counts for complete games
containing passers and semi-vetoes.
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Lemma 13. For n ≥ 1 we have
CGPSV(n) =
 0 if n = 1,2 if n = 2,
1 otherwise
and CGPSV(n, t) =
 1 if t = 1, n = 2,1 if t = 2, n ≥ 2,
0 otherwise.
Proof. For n = 1 no semi-veto is possible and for n = 2 there are only three complete
games. Assuming w.l.o.g. that voter 1 is a passer the remaining possibilities are given by
Wm =
{{1}, {2}} and Wm = {{1}}. In the first mentioned complete game both players
are passers and semi-vetoes so that we have t = 1. In the second case voter 1 is a passer
and voter 2 a semi-veto so that we have t = 2.
Due to the definition of a semi-veto for n ≥ 3 the only possible semi-veto is player 1
and there can be no other passers besides player 1. Thus we haveWm =
{{1}, {2, . . . , n}}.

Even more mapping to dual games is a bijection between the corresponding classes
of complete games of Lemma 12 and Lemma 13, since the pairs vetoes/passers and
semi-vetoes/semi-passers are interchanged, see Definition 6 and the comment thereafter.
Due to the definition of a semi-passer (for n ≥ 2) a complete game cannot contain
both a semi-passer and a null voter. Similarly a complete game cannot contain both a
semi-veto and a null voter.
The remaining pairs of distinguished types of voters are veto/semi-veto, passer/semi-
passer, veto/null, and passer/null. The respective counts are denoted by the terms
CGVSV(n), CGPSP(n), CGVN(n), CGPN(n), CGVSV(n, t), CGPSP (n, t), CGV N(n, t),
and CGPN(n, t). We denote the corresponding classes by CGVSV(n), CGPSP(n),
CGVN (n), CGPN (n), CGVSV(n, t), CGPSP(n, t), CGVN (n, t), and CGPN (n, t).
Theorem 3. For all positive integers n > 1 and t > 1 there is a bijection between
CGVSV(n, t), CGPSP(n, t), CGVN (n, t) and CGPN (n, t).
Proof. We first define a bijection h between CGVN (n, t) and CGPN (n, t). If (n,M) ∈
CGVN (n, t) then let
h(n,M) = (n,M∗)
where (n,M∗) is the dual game of (n,M).
Now we need to check that:
1. The map h is well–defined.
2. The map h is injective.
3. The map h is surjective.
Well-defined. We have to prove that h(n,M) = (n,M∗) ∈ CGPN (n, t). This is trivially
true because the dual of a complete game is a complete game too, i ∈ N is null in (N,W )
if and only if i ∈ N is null in (N,W ∗), and i ∈ N has veto in (N,W ) if and only if
i ∈ N is a passer in (N,W ∗).
Injective. Let (n,M), (m,P) ∈ CGVN (n, t) with h(n,M) = h(m,P). Let h(n,M) =
h(m,P) = (g,Q). Because of the definition of h we have
g = n = m and Q =M∗ = P∗
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and after applying duality to the last equation we obtain the desired equality, i.e. Q∗ =
(M∗)∗ =M and Q∗ = (P∗)∗ = P
Surjective. Let (m,P) ∈ CGPN (n, t), then it is clear that (m,P∗) ∈ CGVN (n, t) and
h(m,P∗) = (m,P).
Next we remark that the same mapping is also a bijection from CGVSV(n, t) to
CGPSP(n, t). As before all three conditions can be easily checked.
Finally we define a bijection h′ between CGVSV(n, t) and CGVN (n, t). Let (n,M) ∈
CGVSV(n, t), with n = (n1, . . . , nt) and mi,j be the components of M as defined in
Lemma 5-(v) with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t. With this we set h′(n,M) = (n′,M′), where
n′ = (n1, n3, . . . , nt, n2),
M′ =
 m1,1 m1,3 · · · m1,t 0... ... . . . ... ...
mr−1,1 mr−1,3 · · · mr−1,t 0
 .
We note that we have r ≥ 2. In other words, we have shifted the second equivalence class
of voters to the tth equivalence class, while replacing the second column (m1,2, . . . ,mr,2)
T
by the all-zero vector and deleted the last row of M.
Due to Lemma 5-(v) the second column and the last row of M are uniquely charac-
terized by the values of n1, . . . , nt. So it remains to check that the resulting games are
complete games with t equivalence classes of voters, i.e. that they satisfy the conditions
from Theorem 1, which can be done easily. 
Corollary 2. For all positive integers n > 1 and t > 1 we have
CGVSV(n, t) = CGPSP(n, t) = CGVN(n, t) = CGPN(n, t).
Proposition 2.
1. CGVN(n, 2) = n− 1 (whenever n ≥ 2),
2. CGVN(n, 3) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
6
(whenever n ≥ 4),
3. CGVN(n, 4) = F (n+ 8)− 1
6
(n4 − 2n3 + 26n2 + 47n+ 132) (whenever n ≥ 5).
Proof.
1. Assume t = 2, for each vector (n1, n2) with n1 + n2 = n with 0 < n1 < n there is
a unique matrix which is M = (n1, 0).
2. Assume t = 3, for each vector (n1, n2, n3) there are n2 − 1 matrices of type M =
(n1, a, 0) where 0 < a < n2. Hence,
CGVN(n, 3) = 1(n− 3) + 2(n− 4) + · · ·+ (n− 3)1 =
n−1∑
i=1
i · (n− 2− i)
which coincides with the given expression since
n−1∑
i=1
i = n(n−1)2 and
n−1∑
i=1
i2 =
n(n−1)(2n−1)
6 .
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3. If we remove the null voters from a complete game with t types of voters (having at
least one null voter), we obtain a complete game with t− 1 types of voters without
null voters. Thus we have the recurrence relation
CGVN(n, 4) =
n∑
i=1
CGV(n− i, 3)− CGVN(n− i, 3)
=
n−4∑
i=1
CGV(n− i, 3)− CGVN(n− i, 3)
and substituting in it the two known results
CGV(n, 3) = F (n+ 7)− 1
2
(n3 + 2n2 + 13n+ 26)
CGVN(n, 3) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
6
yields (for n ≥ 5)
CGVN(n, 4) =
n−1∑
k=4
[
F (k + 7)− 1
2
(k3 + 2k2 + 13k + 26)− 1
6
(k − 1)(k − 2)(k − 3)
]
= F (n+ 8)− 1
6
(n4 − 2n3 + 26n2 + 47n+ 132)

Starting with n = 5 the first ten numbers of the sequence CGVN(n, 4) are
1, 8, 35, 113, 303, 717, 1552, 3145, 6062, 11242.
Asymptotically we have
lim
n→∞
CGVN(n, 4)
CG(n, 2)
= lim
n→∞
F (n+ 8) +O(n4)
F (n+ 6) +O(n2)
= lim
n→∞
F (n+ 8)
F (n+ 6)
=
(
1 +
√
5
2
)2
Thus, when n is fix and large enough, the number of complete games with four types
of voters having vetoes and nulls (or one of the combinations passers/nulls, vetoes/semi-
vetoes, or passers/semi-passer) is almost equal to the number of complete games with
two types of voters multiplied by
(
1 +
√
5
)2
/4.
5. Enumerations with more than two distinguished type of voters in a com-
plete simple game
Continuing the considerations from the previous two sections we study complete
games containing at least three of the six distinguished types from Definition 5. Complete
simple games containing a dictator and at least another distinguished type of voters are
completely treated at the beginning of Section 4. So in the following we assume that no
dictator is present, including the combination of a passer and a veto, which then would
be a dictator. Summarizing the results from Section 4 we state that only the following
seven combinations of two distinguished type of voters are possible:
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• semi-passer and semi-veto
• veto and semi-veto
• passer and semi-passer
• passer and semi-veto
• veto and semi-passer
• veto and null voter
• passer and null voter
If a complete game contains at least one semi-passer and at least one semi-veto then no
other distinguished types of voters can occur. If we represent the possible combinations
of two distinguished types of voters by an edge, we obtain a quadrangle on the set
{veto,passer, semi-veto, semi-passer} of vertices. Thus there are no complete games with
at least three distinguished types of voters.
6. Conclusion and future research
In this paper we have studied complete games containing at least one voter of a list of
distinguished types of voters and provided several bijections between the corresponding
classes of voting systems. This contributes to the program of numerical characterization
and classification of voting systems initiated by von Neumann and Morgenstern [32].
It turned out that all of the counts CGV (n, 3), CGN(n, 3), CGP (n, 3), CGSV (n, 3),
CGSP (n, 3), CGV N(n, 4), CGPN(n, 4), CGPSP (n, 4), and CGV SV (n, 4) of com-
plete games with distinguished and two additional types of voters belong to the class
Θ
((
(1 +
√
5)/2
)n)
as well as CG(n, 2). Thus, the addition of just one of the following
set of voters: vetoers, passers, nulls, vetoers and nulls, passers or nulls, semi-vetoers or
semi-passers in a complete game with two types of voters does not alter the asymptotic
behavior. For a fix n the number of these games is equal to k · F (n + 6) + P (n) where
for each case k is a positive constant that takes one of the two values (1 +
√
5)/2 or(
1 +
√
5
)2
/4, and P is a polynomial.
The exact enumeration formulas are mainly based on the previously determined enu-
meration of complete games with two types of voters, i.e. CG(n, 2). A quite natural next
step now is to consider complete games with three types of voters. So far we were only
able to compute the first few exact values. For 4 ≤ n ≤ 21 the sequence CG(n, 3) is
given by
6, 50, 262, 1114, 4278, 15769, 58147, 221089, 886411, 3806475, 17681979,
89337562, 492188528, 2959459154, 19424078142, 139141985438,
1087614361775, 9274721292503.
For t ≥ 4 and n ≥ 10 we could only compute the additional values CG(10, 4) = 4570902,
CG(11, 4) = 59776637, CG(12, 4) = 1047858496, CG(13, 4) = 26000281487, CG(10, 5) =
412734188, CG(11, 5) = 29086472429, and CG(10, 6) = 42427707348.
25
Significant sub-classes of the studied structures are those which are weighted games
and, or more generally, roughly weighted games being complete. Even though that there
exist combinatorial characterizations of weighted games (see [13] and [40]) and of roughly
weighted games (see [21]), very little is known on closed enumeration formulas for these
much more restrictive voting structures, besides May’s Theorem for voting systems with
only one type of voters.
Using the characterization of weighted games with two types of voters given in [14] we
can at least compute some exact values of WG(n, 2) without generating the entire class of
corresponding complete games with two types of voters. We would like to remark that it
took only 19 days of computation time to compute the values of WG(n, 2) for all n ≤ 200.
Two examples are given by WG(100, 2) = 27970501 and WG(200, 2) = 851946591.
Having these numerical data at hand we observe that WG(n, 2) ≈ 0.002531n5 + O(n4).
And indeed it is not too hard to come up with an upper bound of WG(n, 2) ≤ n515 + 4n4,
see [11], and a similar lower bound. The determination of an exact enumeration formula
for WG(n, 2) seems to be an interesting but resolvable research problem.
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